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Katz: Husband and Wife--Right to Wife to Sue Her Husband for Personal I

STUDENT NOTES
HUSBAND AND WIFE RIGHT OF WIFE TO SUE HER HUSBAND
INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES. FOR PERSONAL INJURIES -

Plaintiff and defendant are husband and wife. She has brought
her action to recover for personal injuries, which she alleges she
suffered by reason of his negligence. Should the wife be allowed
to maintain this action against her husband?
So far as can be ascertained this proposition has not been decided by the courts of West Virginia. At common-law, and under
the interpretation of Married Women's Statutes in most of our
states, such an action has not been maintainable. However, there
is a strong and ever-growing minority rule which permits such an
action. This has probably come about because of the changing conceptions of the domestic relation, the automobile and the introduction of indemnity liability insurance.
The West Virginia Statute' conferred upon married women
certain rights which did not exist under the common law. The Code
provides:
"A married woman may sue or be sued in any court of law
the same in all cases as if she
or chancery in this state ....
were a feme sole."
The New Code of West Virginia,' effective in January of this
year, does not change the provision in any material particular,
except to change "feme sole" to "single woman," and to add:
"Husband shall not be joined with her in any case unless
for reasons other than the martial relation."
Under statutes like our own some states have given the wife the
right to sue her husband in tort.' Other states refused so to do.'
The West Virginia court permits a wife to sue alone for injuries
to herself caused by a third party,' and to contract in regard to
Under the New
her separate estate as if she were a feme sole.'
Code a married woman may be a member of a partnership with
aer husband," may have all the provisions of the trust laws available to her' and may now make a contract with her husband, if
there is a written memorandum thereof.' This is a new section and
'W. VA. CODE ANv. (Barnes 1923), Ch. 66, § 15.
2N. VA. REV. CODE (1931), Ch. 48, Art. 3, § 19.
3 S~o n. 24, infra.
See n. 18, infra.

Normile v. Wheeling Traction Co., 57 W. Va. 132, 49 S. E. 1030.
0Williamson v. Cline, 40 W. Va. 194, 20 S. E. 917. (1895).
7W. VA. REv. CODE (1931), Ch. 48, Art. 3, § 18.

(1905).

'Supra § 12.
'Bupra § § 8 & 9.
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abrogates the contrary rule established in Bolyard v. Bolyard."
The new code, then, has made many important changes and has
What effect
extended further the rights of married women.
would these changes have on the West Virginia Supreme Court
in interpreting the Married Women's Statutes and declaring
whether or not, under it, a wife could sue her husband in tort?.'
It is generally held that statutes authorizing a wife to maintain
an action in her own name for a personal injury to her do not
authorize her to maintain an action against her husband for such
an injury; such a statute authorizes her to maintain alone such
actions as previously could be sustained when brought by the husband alone or by the husband and wife jointly."
This proposition is supported by Thompson v. Thompson,' decided by the Supreme Court of the United States. It was a case
of assault and battery. The statute, in part, read as follows:
"Married women shall have the power to sue separately for
the recovery, security or protection of their property, and for
torts committed against them as fully and freely as if they
were unmarried."'"
In holding that the action could not be maintained against the
husband the court said:
"The statute was not intended to give a right of action
against the husband, but to allow the wife, in her own name,
to maintain actions of tort which at common law must be
This
brought in the joint names of herself and husband.
construction is, we think, obvious from a reading of the
statute in the light of the purpose sought to be accomplished.
It gives a reasonable effect to the terms used and accomplishes,
as we believe, the legislative intent, which is the primary object of all construction of statutes."
In Leonardi v. Leonardi" it was decided that under a statute
permitting a wife to sue as if she were a feme sole, she could not
maintain an action for personal injuries resulting from her husband's negligent acts. The court approved the reasoning of the
Thompson Case, supra.
" 79 W. Va. 554, 91 S. E. 529 (1917).
"Under the present code and the case of Roseberry v. Roseberry, 27 W.
Va. 759, a wife could not sue her husband at law on a contract made between
them. We can see the liberal attitude of our legislature when we examine
the new code and find that such an action is now permitted if the contract is
in writing.
"13 R. C. L. p. 1396, § 444.
"218 U. S. 611, 54 L. ed. 1180 (1910).
Ihid.
1521 Ohio App. 110, 153 N. E. 93. 1925).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol37/iss1/7

2

Katz: Husband and Wife--Right to Wife to Sue Her Husband for Personal I
STUDENT NOTES
The Virginia Married Women's Statute is similar to that of
West Virginia."8 In the case of Keister v. Keister,"' the Virginia
court refused recovery for assault and battery.
"The portion of the statute under consideration has reference only to the remedies thereby given to married women,
and does not confer the substantive right necessary to support the right of a married woman to sue her husband."
Many states follow the views expressed above as applied to negligent as well as intentional wrongs.I
Opposed to the general view taken by the courts as to the effect of the Married Women's statutes on the right of the wife to
sue her husband in tort, the statutes have been construed in
several very recent cases so to abrogate the common law concept
of the legal identity of husband and wife as to permit such an
action. And the opinions in these recent cases seem to indicate a
growing inclination to construe such statutes liberally and, if
possible, to give this right of action thereunder, and not to consider it as opposed to public policy so to do."'
In Roberts v. Roberts,' the Supreme Court of North Carolina
announced this doctrine:
"A wife may maintain an action against her husband for
injury arising from his negligence. "
The statute considered by the court is the same as the West Virginia statute. The court relied upon the statute as tending to
enlarge the rights of married women and abolishing the common
law concept.
The court recognized a want of harmony in the
'Supra n. 1, 2.
17123 Va. 157, 96 S. E. 315
tm

(1918).

Heyman v. Heyman, 19 Ga. App. 634, 92 S. B. 25 (1917); Rogers v.
Rogers, 265 Mo. 200, 177 S. W. 382 (1915); Lillunhamp v. Rippetoe, 133
Tenn. 57, 179 S. W. 628 (1915) ; Sykes v. Speer, 102 Tex. 451) 112 S. W. 422
(1908); Schultz v. Christopher, 65 Wash. 496, 118 Pac. 629 (1911); Strom
v. Strom, 98 Minn. 427, 107 N. W. 1047 (1906); Peters v. Peters, 156 Cal. 32,
103 Pac. 219 (1909); Austin v. Austin, 136 Miss. 61, 100 So. 591 (1924);
Finn' v. Finn, 19 Ohio App. 302 (1924); Waltman v. Waltman, 153 Minn. 217,
189 N. W. 1022 (1922); Also see the cases collected in note (1920) 6 A. L.
R. 1038.
19 The cases are collected in note (1920) 6 A. L. R. 1038.
10Roberts v. Roberts, 189 N. C. 566, 118 S. E. 9 (1923).
"Defendant, accompanied by his wife, plaintiff, and children, were driving
on the road between Marshall and Mars Hill, and while turning a sharp curve
caused his car to collide with one driven by Raburn Hensley. Plaintiff was
injured and sued her husband. Judgment for plaintiff affirmed."
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authorities and chose to adopt the minority rule. In Bushnell v.
Bushnerln a wife was allowed to sue when injuried in an automobile driven by her husband, when the latter fell asleep at the
The opinion distinguished such actions as concern mutual
wheel.
liabilities which inhere in the marriage contract and stated that
a tortious act by the husband, under statute, follows the principle
of liability announced by the court in the Brown Case, decided
by them at an earlier date.
New Hampshire and West Virginia have similar statutes. In the
former state, an action for assault and battery was held to be
maintainable.
"When the legislature enacted this section it intended to
remove all the disabilities the common law imposed on married
women in so far as the right to sue was concerned, and with
certain exceptions, to put husband and wife on an equality in
In a word, if a
respect to property, torts and contracts.
married woman is injured by another's illegal act the statute
gives her a remedy, even though that other is her husband.
Gilman
And it is illegal for a husband to assault his wife."
v. "iman.'
Many states now follow this minority rule.-'
In refusing such an action the courts reason as follows:
(1) Such an action is contrary to public policy and against
the established common law.
(2) It tends to disrupt the home; disturbs the marital relationship; and interferes with domestic tranquility.
(3) The proper statutory interpretation leads to the conclusion that the Married Women's statutes merely affect the remedy
and not the substantive rights of married women.
(4) The divorce and criminal courts should settle these differences.
(5) If insurance is involved, there is danger of fraud and
collusion.
Bushnell v. Bushnell, 103 Conn. 583, 131 Atl. 432 (1925).
Brown v. Brown, 88 Conn. 42, 89 Atl. 89 (1914).
2 Gilman v. Gilman, 78 N. H. 4, 95 Atl. 657 (1915).
"Crowell v. Crowell, 180 N. C. 516, 105 S. E. 206 (1920) ; Roberts v. Roberts, 185 N. C. 566, 118 S. E. 9 (1923); Prosser v. Prosser, 114 S.C. 45,
102 S. E. 787 (1920); Brown v. Brown, 88 Conn. 42, 89 Atl. 89 (1914):
Gilman v. Gilman, 78 N. H. 4, 95 Atl. 657 (1915); Fiedeer v. Fiedeer, 42
Okla. 124, 140 Pac. 1022 (1914); Fitzpatrick v. Owens, 124 Ark. 167, 186 S.
W. 832 (1916); Mathewson v. Mathewson, 79 Conn. 23, 63 Atl. 285 (1906);
Harris v. Harris, 211 Ala. 222, 100 So. 333 (1924); Bushnell v. Buahnell,
103 Conn. 583, 131 Atl. 432 (1925).
2

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol37/iss1/7

4

Katz: Husband and Wife--Right to Wife to Sue Her Husband for Personal I
STUDENT NOTES
The liberal courts, following the minority rule, advance these
reasons for permitting the action:
(1) The Married Women's Statutes have completely changed
the common law rule.
(2) There is a changing conception of the marital relation and
therefore the result is justifiable.
The writer believes that insurance has played an important part
in bringing about this minority rule. Today almost every motorist
The husband, in driving the car, is
carries liability insurance.
negligent. The wife is injured. In order to reach his insurance she
must sue him. The courts, the writer believes, have gone far to
recognize this minority rule, thereby to permit the wife to recover
this insurance fund. This, as a reason, cannot be openly stated as
evidence of insurance in such cases is inadmissible because prejudicial.
On the ground of recovering the insurance the minority rule
may well be sustained. But to permit such a rule in this type of
case necessarily calls for its extension into the field of intentional
wrongs. As such, it is entirely too broad. The common law justifications for the rule still apply. The interpretation of the statutes
under the majority rule may not seem logical-but law is not always a matter of logic. The desirable social results should be the
deciding factor in construing statutes. It may seem unfair to allow
the wife an opportunity to reach this insurance fund-but greater
harm would result from a rule of law which disturbs domestic
tranquility and leads to social evils.
-JEROME

KATZ.

ToRTS-WiLD ANIMALS-NEGLIGENCE AS BASIS OF LIABILTY FOR

PERSONAL INJURIES.-The question of liability for injury done by
vicious animals, wild or domesticated, has not often reached the
Supreme Court of Appeals of this State. The recent adjudication
of Vaughan v. Miller Brothers "101" Ranch Wild WVest Show is
therefore interesting, throwing light as it does on a hitherto unadjudicated point. In an appeal to an order quashing an affidavit
for attachment against defendant, which affidavit merely set forth
the injury, ownership of the ape which bit off the plaintiff's finger
and the fact that the animal was on exhibition, the court said in
'153 S. E. 289 (1930).
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